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CERCLA CLEANUP COSTS UNDER COMPREHENSIVE
GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICIES:
PROPERTY DAMAGE OR ECONOMIC
DAMAGE?
INTRODUCTION
The 1980's have been a time of environmental awakening in the United
States, as Americans have become aware of the need to control waste and
to reclaim the environment.' The polluting of the environment, however,
is nothing new. In fact, chemical companies and waste haulers used to
dispose of toxic wastes by sealing the wastes in drums and burying them,
or by pouring them directly into the waterways.2 Since the emergence of
chemical production, the state of waste disposal has been disgraceful,3
and we are left with Times Beach, Love Canal, the Valley of the Drums4
1. The problem of waste disposal has recently surfaced in disturbing ways. A barge
carrying 3,100 tons of garbage from Islip, Long Island was refused permission to dock
and dump its cargo by six states and three countries and spent months at sea. See N.Y.
Times, May 18, 1987, at Al, col. 1. In addition, beaches were closed on the east coast
after medical debris and human waste washed up on shore. See N.Y. Times, Jul. 12,
1988, at Al, col. 5. One New York City Health Commissioner referred to the 1980's as
"the time the planet struck back." N.Y. Times, Jul. 13, 1988, at Al, col. 2.
2. Waste generators, without regulatory incentives, either dumped wastes in ill-pre-
pared ponds and landfills, burned them in an uncontrolled fashion, or turned wastes over
to transporters, who often disposed of them improperly. See, e.g., Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, H.IL Rep. No. 1016, 96th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 1, 18-19, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 6119,6121-
22 (hereinafter "CERCLA House Report"); Popkin, Hazardous Waste Cleanup and Dis-
aster Management, 28 Env't 2, 3 (April 1986).
In 1979, the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") conducted a
study and determined that as many as 30,000 to 50,000 inactive hazardous waste sites
existed. 1,200 to 2,000 of these sites were estimated to present a "serious risk to public
health." See CERCLA House Report, supra at 6120. For criticism of this survey as
sensationalism, see 126 Cong. Rec. H33,423 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 1980) (remarks of Rep.
Crane of Illinois); 126 Cong. Rec. H26,231-32 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1980) (remarks of Rep.
Jeffries of Kansas). Presently, it is impossible to determine the precise dimensions of the
toxic chemical problem, but clearly it has caused a major and growing health problem,
adding significantly to the disease burden of the United States. See I A Legislative His-
tory of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980 (Superfund) Public Law 96-510, at 560, 739-40 (statement of Nathan Stark, Under
Secretary of Health and Human Services, in a letter transmitting a Surgeon General's
Report, Nov. 20, 1980).
3. Until the 1970's, most businesses were in the habit of simply throwing their
"goop" into local dumps or letting it collect in "oozy lagoons." See Finegan, Double
Billing, Inc., March 1988, at 50; supra note 2 and accompanying text. Nobody really
knows how much hazardous waste has been disposed of inadequately, see supra note 2,
but it is estimated that approximately 70% of the hazardous waste comes from the chem-
ical industry. See M. Katzman, Chemical Catastrophes: Regulating Environmental Risk
Through Pollution Liability Insurance 14 (1985).
4. While these are only a few examples of problematic inactive hazardous waste
sites, they dramatize the seriousness of the environmental catastrophe at issue. Love
Canal, in Niagara Falls, New York, is one of the most infamous hazardous waste sites in
the United States. There, the town built a public school on top of reclaimed land that
had previously been used by Hooker Chemical and Plastics Corporation as a dump site
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and countless future sites to remind us of these disastrous actions and to
inspire the desire for action.
In 1980, Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"),5 popularly
known as "Superfund." Enacted in response to such disasters as Love
Canal,6 CERCLA authorizes the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA"), under certain circumstances, to clean up inactive hazardous
waste sites and then to seek reimbursement of its cleanup costs7 from the
for chemical wastes. Also, a residential subdivision was built adjacent to the site. In the
1970's, authorities discovered that hazardous chemicals from the dump site had entered
the neighborhood water supply. As a result, approximately two hundred families were
evacuated from Love Canal, and the property in the entire neighborhood became virtu-
ally worthless. Love Canal health data showed elevated miscarriage and birth defect
rates along with many other negative health effects, the nature and extent of which are
still in dispute. See CERCLA House Report, supra note 2, at 6121-22.
The Valley of the Drums in Shephardsville, Kentucky, contained over 17,000 barrels of
hazardous waste that had been stacked illegally in a waste hauler's backyard. The EPA
discovered the drums in a seriously deteriorating state. See CERCLA House Report,
supra note 2, at 6121.
Times Beach, Missouri is a dioxin-contaminated site. In 1982, tests on 112 of 130
residents in nearby Imperial, Missouri, showed abnormalities in blood, liver, or kidney
functions. See M. Katzman, supra note 3, at 2. The EPA, in response to the severity of
the dioxin hazard, bought Times Beach and evacuated its 2,000 inhabitants. See id.
5. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 &
Supp. 1988)), reauthorized and amended in part by Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at scat-
tered sections of 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 (Supp. 1988)).
6. See CERCLA House Report, supra note 2, at 6122.
7. The EPA derives its response authority from CERCLA § 104, codified at 42
U.S.C. § 9604, which provides in pertinent part:
(1) Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a substantial
threat of such a release into the environment, or (B) there is a release or sub-
stantial threat of release into the environment of any pollutant or contaminant
which may present an imminent and substantial danger to the public health or
welfare, the President is authorized to act ... to remove or arrange for the
removal of, and provide for remedial action relating to such hazardous sub-
stance, pollutant, or contaminant at any time (including its removal from any
contaminated natural resource), or take any other response measure . . .
deem[ed] necessary to protect the public health or welfare or the environment.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(a)(1) (Supp. 1988); see United States v. Northeastern Pharm. &
Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 733 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987); United
States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 904 (D.N.H. 1985). The President delegates to the
EPA and other administrative agencies the authority to implement CERCLA through
Exec. Order No. 12580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2,923 (Jan. 29, 1987), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 9615 (Supp. 1988).
In addition, the President is required to consult with "the affected state or states before
determining any appropriate remedial action to be taken" in response to a release or
threat of release of any hazardous substances. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(b)(2) (Supp.
1988). Where states or local governments are capable of carrying out the actions deemed
necessary to respond effectively to the release or threatened release of hazardous sub-
stances and where such governments agree to carry out the actions, the President must
enter into contracts or cooperative agreements with the states or local governments to
take the actions. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9604(b)(3), (d)(1) (Supp. 1988).
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careless chemical producers and waste haulers.'
No one disputes the liability of these polluters for damage done to the
environment.9 The question that arises today, rather, is whether the
Comprehensive General Liability ("CGL") insurance policies"° taken
out by these polluters years before toxic waste cleanup expenses became a
problem cover expenses incurred by the EPA in cleaning up toxic
waste."l This Note discusses the issue of the classification of EPA recov-
ery costs under CERCLA. Courts have disagreed whether to classify
these suits as claims for "property damage," 2 which are recoverable
under a CGL policy, or as claims for equitable relief, 3 for which the
CGL policy provides no coverage. 4 Because uncertainty over this term
has caused confusion in the courts and delayed cleanups, a consensus as
to its meaning is essential.
Part I of this Note sets forth the basic provisions of CERCLA, empha-
sizing its cost recovery provisions, and addresses the impact of the
amendment to CERCLA, the Superfund Amendments and Reauthoriza-
tion Act of 1986 ("SARA").'" Part II analyzes the conflict in the courts'
classifications of response costs and argues that the courts must focus on
the relief sought by the EPA, which is in the form of restitution. This
focus should cause courts to find that EPA cleanup costs constitute equi-
table, monetary expenses, and not "property damage" within the mean-
ing of CGL policies.
I. CERCLA BACKGROUND
Congress enacted CERCLA in 198016 to combat the specific problem
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982 & Supp. 1988); infra note 24.
9. For cases in which courts presume the liability of polluters, see, for example,
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1351 (4th Cir. 1987), cert denied,
108 S. Ct. 703 (1988); Broadwell Realty Servs., Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 218 NJ.
Super. 516, 519, 528 A.2d 76, 77 (App. Div. 1987).
10. See infra notes 37-48 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 49, 50, 101 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 42, 101 and accompanying text.
13. Equitable remedies are distinguishable from damages. "Damages is a form of
substitutional redress which seeks to replace the loss in value with a sum of money. Res-
titution, conversely, is [an equitable remedy] designed to reimburse a party for restoring
the status quo." Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1353 (4th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988). Injunctions and specific performance decrees,
for example, clearly are equitable remedies. D. Laycock, Modern American Remedies 5
(1985). See infra notes 36, 49, 59 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 49, 59 and accompanying text.
15. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499,
100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 (Supp.
1988)).
16. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 &
Supp. 1988)), reauthorized and amended in part by Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at scat-
tered sections of 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 (Supp. 1988)).
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of inactive hazardous waste sites. 7 Under CERCLA, upon learning that
a waste site has released hazardous substances into the environment or
threatens such a release, the EPA notifies the party found responsible for
the pollution 8 and gives that party an opportunity to clean up the site
voluntarily.' 9 Should the liable party fail to comply with the cleanup
request, CERCLA authorizes the EPA to implement response actions2
0
and to seek from the responsible party compensation for its response
costs. 2 1 Due to its sovereign interest in the general public health and
welfare,22 the government may implement these actions at any site that
actually or potentially presents a threat to the environment. CERCLA
initially provided a $1.6 billion fund to be used for these response ac-
tions,23 and broad-based liability intended to cover any and all parties
who at any time handled the hazardous waste.24
17. See supra note 4; CERCLA House Report, supra note 2, at 6120-23; Administra-
tive Testimony to the Subcommittee on Environmental Pollution and Resource Protec-
tion, Committee on Environment and Public Works, United States Senate, June 20, 1979,
reprinted in 1 A Legislative History of The Comprehensive Environmental Response
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (Superfund), Public Law 96-510, at 55, 57
(statement of Sen. Muskie, co-chairman, Subcommittee on Resource Protection and En-
vironmental Pollution).
18. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9612(a) (Supp. 1988); see also supra note 7. In an emergency,
however, the EPA can implement cleanup actions without notifying the responsible par-
ties. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(a)(1) (Supp. 1988); see also United States v. Ottati & Goss,
Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361, 1396-97 (D.N.H. 1985).
19. In cases where the insured voluntarily cleans up the contaminated site, courts
have found coverage under the CGL policy as long as the policyholder informs the in-
surer of its intention to respond. See, e.g., Broadwell Realty Servs., Inc. v. Fidelity &
Casualty Co., 218 N.J. Super. 516, 525-26, 528 A.2d 76, 81 (App. Div. 1987); Millen
Indus., Inc. v. Greater N.Y. Mutual Ins. Policy, No. 77-22174, slip op. at 7 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. June 18, 1980); see infra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
20. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(c)(4) (Supp. 1988). Section 9601(24) defines "remedy" or
"remedial action" as used in § 9604(c)(4) to include "storage, confinement . . . [or]
cleanup of released substances or contaminated materials, recycling or reuse .... diver-
sion, destruction, segregation of reactive wastes ... and any monitoring reasonably re-
quired to assure that such actions protect the public health and welfare and the
environment." 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(24) (Supp. 1988).
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 9608 (1982 & Supp. 1988); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp.,
572 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D. Ohio 1983); supra note 7.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 734
(8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987); Lansco, Inc. v. Department of Envtl.
Protection, 138 N.J. Super. 275, 283, 350 A.2d 520, 524 (Ch. Div. 1975), aff'd 145 N.J.
Super. 433, 368 A.2d 363 (App. Div. 1976) (per curiam); Kutsher's Country Club Corp.
v. Lincoln Ins. Co., 119 Misc. 2d 889, 892, 465 N.Y.S.2d 136, 139 (Sup. Ct. 1983).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 9631(b)(2) (1982), repealed by Pub. L. 99-499, Title V, § 517(c)(1),
Oct. 17, 1986, 100 Stat. 1774; see United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802,
805 (S.D. Ohio 1983). The legislature realized that the $1.6 billion fund (the
"Superfund") would be inadequate to cover all abandoned hazardous waste sites. See
CERCLA House Report, supra note 2, at 6136. It thus included a provision to recover
monies expended on cleanup costs. See id.
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982 & Supp. 1988). CERCLA provides that:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned
or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal
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CERCLA's legislative history is confusing and sparse.2 1 A monumen-
tal piece of legislation,26 CERCLA was rushed through the legislature as
Congress strove to adopt some sort of environmental law before the expi-
ration of the ninety-sixth Congress and the commencement of the Rea-
gan administration.27 Due to this time constraint, the bill was passed
under a suspension of the rules, during which bills must be adopted with-
out amendment.28 There was, therefore, little debate during CERCLA's
or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treat-
ment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other
party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by an-
other party oi entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for trans-
port to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by
such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes
the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for-
A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national
contingency plan;
B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person con-
sistent with the national contingency plan;
C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, in-
cluding the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss result-
ing from such a release; and
D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out
under section 9604(i) of this title.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a) (Supp. 1988). In addition, courts have indicated that CERCLA
should be given a broad and liberal construction in order to avoid frustrating the govern-
ment's ability to respond promptly and efficiently. See, e.g., Cadillac Fairview/Califor-
nia, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 840 F.2d 691, 696 (9th Cir. 1988) (prior governmental action
not prerequisite to suit under CERCLA § 9607(a)); United States v. Northeastern
Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 737 (8th Cir. 1986) (no retroactivity limitation in
providing for recovery of pre-CERCLA response costs), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146
(1987); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn.
1982) ("CERCLA should be given a broad and liberal construction").
This broad-based liability often leads to anomalous results. See Mraz v. Canadian Uni-
versal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1326 (4th Cir. 1986) (prior to enactment of CERCLA,
owners of a solvent recycling plant arranged with state and county health department
officials to dispose of 1300 barrels of chemical wastes in a clay-lined pit, but later were
held liable by EPA for costs of cleaning up the site); Finegan, supra note 3, at 50, 58
(operator of waste treatment facility in Oswego, New York was insolvent, so EPA placed
$12 million cleanup cost on former customers who believed their wastes had been inciner-
ated lawfully and safely).
25. See United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 737 (8th
Cir. 1986), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987); Grad, A Legislative History of the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980,
8 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1, 20 (1982).
26. Characterized by President Carter when signed into law as "landmark in its scope
and in its impact on preserving the environmental quality of our country," Current De-
velopments, 11 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1261 (Dec. 19, 1980), CERCLA was the end product
of two competing bills: S. 1480, introduced to the Senate on July 11, 1979 by Sen. Cul-
ver, see 125 Cong. Rec. S17,988 (daily ed. July 11, 1979), and H.R. 7020, introduced to
the House on April 2, 1980 by Rep. Florio. See 126 Cong. Rec. H2,490 (daily ed. Apr. 2,
1980).
27. See Grad, supra note 25, at 19.
28. See 126 Cong. Rec. 11,773 (Dec. 3, 1980); Grad, supra note 25, at 29-30.
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creation, and, because members of both houses compromised their views,
congressional intent is difficult to discern.
The task of filling in the statute's gaps thus has fallen to the courts.
For instance, the legislative history explicitly states that the courts are to
determine the standard of liability to be applied under CERCLA.29 Dur-
ing the process of amending CERCLA in 1986,30 however, Congress
made it clear that in its implementation of CERCLA, Congress had
never considered the impact that the broad-based liability provisions ulti-
mately would have on the insurance industry.3 1
II. CGL POLICIES Do NOT COVER EPA RESPONSE COSTS
The question whether costs incurred by the EPA in cleaning up toxic
waste under the prophylactic response provisions of CERCLA constitute
"property damage" within the meaning of a CGL policy presents the
courts with two alternatives: Courts can construe CGL policies, written
years before toxic waste became an issue, to provide coverage for these
cleanup costs, to the detriment of the insurance industry, or courts can
find no coverage under CGL polices, leaving the EPA uncompensated
for its expenses. The second alternative, although seemingly the harsh-
est, is the better choice. By refusing to rely on insurance companies to
clean up the environment, courts can force Congress to act construc-
tively and quickly to find a fair and workable solution.
The threshold issue of classification of damages arises when the EPA
29. Representative Florio, who introduced H.R. 7020 to the House on April 2, 1980,
see supra note 26, stated that the scope of liability and the term "joint and several liabil-
ity" purposely were deleted in order that they be determined by the courts under comm-
mon law principles. See 126 Cong. Rec. 31,965 (1980). Accordingly, the court in United
States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983), established that joint
and several liability under CERCLA be applied on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 808.
Courts universally have adopted this rationale. See, e.g., Bulk Distribution Centers, Inc.
v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1443 n.15 (S.D. Fla. 1984); United States v. North-
eastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 843-44 (W.D. Mo. 1984), modified, 810
F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987); United States v. Price, 577
F. Supp. 1103, 1113-14 (D.N.J. 1983).
In addition, courts have determined that CERCLA has retroactive application, see
Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d at 732; Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562
F. Supp. 1300, 1313-14 (N.D. Ohio 1983), and that under CERCLA, owners of property
at the time hazardous wastes are discovered are liable for cleanup costs, even if they were
not responsible for the pollution. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d
1032, 1043-44 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp.
573, 577-78 (D. Md. 1986).
30. The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"), Pub.
L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-
9675 (1982 & Supp. 1988)) reauthorized CERCLA for the next five years and increased
the Superfund by $8.5 billion, 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1982 & Supp. 1988), reflecting a more
studied evaluation of the magnitude of the problem of inactive hazardous waste sites. See
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, H.R. Rep. No. 253(11), 99th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 1, 48, reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2986, 2998.
31. See infra notes 119-26 and accompanying text.
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cleans up32 and then, pursuant to CERCLA section 107, sues the insured
polluter for recovery of its cleanup costs.33 In turn, the insured polluter
seeks coverage for the EPA's cleanup costs under its CGL policy.' The
insurer refuses to provide coverage, arguing that, because claims for re-
imbursement of cleanup costs constitute claims for economic damage,
these response costs are not covered under the CGL policy; 35 the CGL
policy only covers claims for "property damage" as defined in the CGL
policy,36 not claims for equitable relief. These arguments derive from the
nature of insurance policies in general and of CGL's in particular.
For over forty-five years, the insurance industry has issued general in-
surance policies.37 Promulgation of such standardized policies serves
three purposes: it theoretically clarifies the extent of intended coverage
to the benefit of the courts, the insurers and the insureds; it pools the
32. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(a)(1) (Supp. 1988); see e.g., Continental Ins. Cos. v.
Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977, 980 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
57 U.S.L.W. 3230 (1988); United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d
726, 730 (8th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987); see also Ohio ex reL Brown v.
Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1302 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (state agency cleaned up).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982 & Supp. 1988); see eg., Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1351 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988);
Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1329 (4th Cir. 1986); New Castle
County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 673 F. Supp. 1359, 1362 (D. Del. 1987)
(mem.). CERCLA § 113(b) provides exclusive federal subject matter jurisdication for
claims by the EPA against polluters. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(b) (Supp. 1988).
34. See, e.g., Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1326; New Castle County, 673 F. Supp. at 1362. Con-
tractual issues between an insured and its insurer arising from EPA cleanup actions can
be brought either in state court or in federal court when diversity jurisdiction exists. See
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982).
35. See Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1326; New Castle County, 673 F. Supp. at 1362; 11 G.
Couch, Couch on Insurance 2d § 44:287 (R. Anderson 2d ed. 1982).
36. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1352 (4th Cir. 1987),
cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988); Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325,
1329 (4th Cir. 1986). Although it is true that law and equity have merged for the most
part, certain issues, such as the granting of a jury trial, may hinge upon the classification
of the case as one in equity or in law. See D. Dobbs, Remedies § 2.6, at 68-81 (1973).
The distinction between legal and equitable relief, therefore, remains viable. See id.; Con-
tinental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977, 985-86 (8th Cir.)
(en banc), cert denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3230 (1988); United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204,
212 (3d Cir. 1982); Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712, 715 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 961 (1979), aff'd on reh'g, 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981), cer. denied, 456 U.S. 972
(1982).
37. See General Liability Insurance 1973 Revisions 3 (F. Bardenwerper & D. Hirsch
eds. 1974); Tinker, Comprehensive General Liability Insurance-Perspective and Over-
view, 25 Fed'n Ins. Courts. Q. 217, 220-21 (1975). The National Bureau of Casualty
Underwriters and the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau promulgate standard insurance
policy terms for use by insurance companies that belong or subscribe to either bureau.
See Obrist, New Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policy, in General Liability
Insurance 1973 Revisions 38 (F. Bardenwerper & D. Hirsch eds. 1974).
Recently, eight states filed antitrust suits against thirty-one insurance companies, rein-
surers, brokers, and insurance industry trade associations for allegedly conspiring to cre-
ate an extensive boycott of certain types of commercial general liability insurance,
including insurance for environmental pollution. See N.Y. Times, March 23, 1988, at 1,
col. 1. The validity of the allegations has yet to be determined.
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experience of many companies for rate-making purposes; and standardi-
zation, while benefitting the insurance industry, continues to allow insur-
ers to meet the needs of individual insureds through attachments to
policies.3"
Insurers began issuing standardized CGL policies to businesses in
1940,' 9 when toxic waste had not yet become an issue.40 The CGL poli-
cies at issue in the cases discussed in this Note were written before insur-
ers had any reason to plan for the costs of cleaning up the environment.4,
As a result, these standardized CGL policies generally cover property
damage' or bodily injury43 to a third party caused by the insured if the
damage or injury results from an "occurrence," defined as an unexpected
and unintended event." For example, costs expended by an insured to
38. See Obrist, supra note 37, at 38.
39. See General LiabilityInsurance 1973 Revisions, supra note 37, at 3; Tinker, supra
note 37, at 221.
40. Until the mid-1970's, United States environmental policy focused on regulating
commonplace, visible pollution such as smog and water pollution. See CERCLA House
Report, supra note 2, at 6120; M. Katzman, supra note 3, at 1.
41. See, e.g., Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1350 (4th Cir.
1987) (policy negotiated in 1966, modified periodically, and remained in effect until
1983), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988); Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d
1325, 1326 (4th Cir. 1986) (coverage sought under 1969 policy).
42. The definition of property damage in CGL policies reads as follows:
(1) Physical injury or destruction of tangible property which occurs during
the policy period, including the loss of use thereof at any time resulting
therefrom,
(2) Loss of use of tangible property which has not been physically injured or
destroyed provided such loss of use is caused by an occurrence during the policy
period.
Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977, 979-80 (8th
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3230 (1988); see generally infra note 101 and
accompanying text.
This definition of property damage incorporates revisions made in 1973 intended to
make clear that the substance of the property must be damaged for there to be recovery.
Thus, inadequate performance by the insured, such as a poorly constructed product or
building, does not constitute property damage, but fire damage to a building will. See
Tinker, supra note 37, at 224-25. The 1973 revisions also clarified the "loss of use" cover-
age, which provides that even if tangible property is not damaged physically but is made
useless by an insured, the damage must have been caused by an "occurrence" for cover-
age to apply. Reichenberger, The General Liability Insurance Policy-Analysis of 1973
Revisions, in General Liability Insurance 1973 Revisions 38 (F. Bardenwerper & D.
Hirsch eds. 1974); infra note 44 and accompanying text.
43. See Reichenberger, supra note 42, at 10.
44. See R. Cushman & C. Stamm, Handling Property and Casualty Claims § 2.26, at
55-56 (1985). A CGL occurrence-based policy differs from a claims-made policy, which
provides coverage to the insured for claims made during the policy term, even if the
accident occurred before the policy became effective. M. Katzman, supra note 3, at 85.
For example, Environmental Impairment Liability ("EIL") policies are claims-made pol-
icies that identify a specific retroactive date from which point on coverage will apply for
accidental occurrences. See Parker, The Insurance Crisis and Environmental Protection,
28 Env't 14, 17 (Apr. 1986); M. Katzman, supra note 3, at 85.
The claims-made policy is used to relieve insurers of claims brought long after the
original occurrence, see N.Y. Times, Jun. 11, 1985, at Al, col. 2, because once the policy
terminates, the insured can make no future claim for damage that occurred during the
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repair damage caused to a third party's property caused when a contrac-
tor's crane falls against a third party's building illustrates the type of
property damage covered under the CGL policy.4" As long as it is clear
that the event occurred unexpectedly and unintentionally46 during the
effective period of the CGL policy4' and is not excluded,48 the insurer
will compensate the insured for the costs of repairing the resulting prop-
erty damage.
The Fourth Circuit, recently joined by the Eighth Circuit, consistently
has held that a complaint by the EPA or the state seeking reimbursement
for cleanup costs under CERCLA does not constitute a claim for "injury
to or destruction of property" within the meaning of the CGL policy.
They reason that the EPA claims for recovery of cleanup costs constitute
claims for equitable, monetary relief not covered by a CGL policy.49 In
policy period. This reduces the difficulty of predicting the number of claims that will be
made since there is an applicable termination date. See 50 Fed. Reg. 33,903 (Aug. 21,
1985).
In contrast, under the CGL policy the insured is able to request coverage years after
the policy has terminated, as long as it is proven that the accident or injury occurred
during the effective period of the CGL policy. See Arness & Eliason, Insurance Coverage
for "Property Damage" in Asbestos and Other Toxic Tort Cases, 72 Va. L. Rev. 943, 947
(1986).
45. See Obrist, supra note 37, at 40.
46. Id.; see supra note 44.
47. See Arness & Eliason, supra note 44, at 947.
48. The CGL policy provides a number of exclusions from its coverage. See Obrist,
supra note 37, at 13-26. For discussion of the environmental pollution exclusion, see
infra note 101. Exclusions form an essential part of any standardized insurance contract.
There are four possible reasons for a given exclusion: 1. other forms of insurance exist to
cover an excluded risk, such as automobile insurance and workers' compensation; 2. not
all insureds require more than the bare-bones standardized policy, so exclusions permit
insurance to be affordable to these insureds; 3. insurers are able to avoid covering busi-
ness risks-uninsurable or excessively expensive hazards; and 4. the insured is able to
self-insure for certain hazards. See Tinker, supra note 37, at 264; see also R. Cushman &
C. Stamm, supra note 44, § 1.1, at 3.
49. See Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977,
987 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3230 (1988); Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1352 (4th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988);
Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1329 (4th Cir. 1986); see also Ar-
ness & Eliason, supra note 44, at 961 (remedial activities are not property damage); Note,
The Pollution Exclusion Clause Through The Looking Glass, 74 Geo. LJ. 1237, 1247-48
(1986) (insurers' intent in drafting policies often misconstrued by courts); cf United
States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 750 (8th Cir. 1986) (response
costs incurred by government before enactment of CERCLA are in form of equitable
relief as abatement costs), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987); United States v. Price, 688
F.2d 204, 212 (3d Cir. 1982) ("preliminary injunction designed to prevent an irreparable
injury is conceptually distinct from a claim for damages"); United States v. Mottolo, 605
F. Supp. 898, 913 (D.N.H. 1985) (jury trial in CERCLA § 107 action denied because
claim for reimbursement is equitable in nature); Wehner v. Syntex Corp., 618 F. Supp 37,
37 (E.D. Mo. 1984) (jury trial denied in private action for CERCLA response costs be-
cause type of relief available under CERCLA is equitable in nature).
These courts and legal theorists argue that suits seeking equitable relief are not covered
under a CGL policy and refuse to "indulge in speculation as to whether a court by exer-
cising its inherent power might award damages when none were sought and then con-
clude that such inherent power exists and [the] insurance company must defend an
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contrast, other courts have equated cleanup costs with property damage,
finding that once actual damage to the environment occurs, cleanup costs
that flow from that environmental injury are recoverable under a CGL
policy.5° Both groups of courts base their holdings on interpretations of
the language of the CGL policies and CERCLA provisions pertaining to
EPA response costs.
Finding insurer liability for reimbursement of EPA cleanup costs is
unwarranted and dangerously misguided for three reasons. First, the
parties to the CGL policy typically are of equal negotiating power;5'
therefore, there is no reason to "protect" sophisticated insureds from the
contracts they have signed. Second, the problem of hazardous waste
cleanup is a national one;52 thus Congress, with its superior fact-finding
resources, occupies a much better position than the judiciary to formu-
late productive solutions to the problem.53 Third, misinterpretation of
insurance policies has created uncertainty in the insurance industry and
contributed to an insurance crisis. 54
Courts should focus, as do the Fourth and Eighth Circuits," on the
response authority provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 960456 and the liability pro-
visions of 42 U.S.C. § 9607.57 These sections, when read together, make
it clear that the type of relief sought by the EPA is equitable in nature. 58
action." Ladd Constr. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 73 I11. App. 3d 43, 48, 391
N.E.2d 568, 572 (1979). They thus correctly deny coverage for cleanup costs, thereby
avoiding the temptation to alter the responsibilities between the parties as set forth in the
insurance contract. Id.
50. See Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., No. C 87-20434, slip op. at
41-43 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 1988); New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,
673 F. Supp. 1359, 1365 (D. Del. 1987) (mem.); Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Ex-Cell-O
Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71, 75 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Independent Petrochem. Corp. v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co., 654 F. Supp. 1334, 1359 (D.D.C. 1986); United States v. Conserva-
tion Chem. Co., 653 F. Supp. 152, 194 (W.D. Mo. 1986); Broadwell Realty Servs., Inc. v.
Fidelity & Casualty Co., 218 N.J. Super. 516, 525, 528 A.2d 76, 81 (App. Div. 1987).
For concurring commentators, see Chesler, Rodburg & Smith, Patterns of Judicial Inter-
pretation of Insurance Coverage for Hazardous Waste Site Liability, 18 Rutgers L.J. 9
(1986); Spurgeon, Determining the Scope of "Bodily Injury or Property Damage" Under
the Comprehensive General Liability Policy, 23 Idaho L. Rev. 379 (1986).
51. See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
52. See supra notes 1-4.
53. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
54. See infra Section II.C.
55. See, e.g., Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d
977, 987 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3230 (1988); Maryland Casualty
Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1352 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 703
(1988); Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1329 (4th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 909 (D.N.H. 1985); Wehner v. Syntex Corp., 618 F.
Supp. 37, 37-38 (E.D. Mo. 1984); see also United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem.
Co., 8 10 F.2d 726, 749 (8th Cir. 1986), (response costs under CERCLA sought in form of
restitution, an equitable remedy), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987); cf United States v.
Price, 688 F.2d 204, 212 (3d Cir. 1982) (request for injunction and request for funds for
diagnostic study are not claims for damages).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1982 & Supp. 1988).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982 & Supp. 1988).
58. See infra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
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The proper judicial finding is that coverage is not provided under a CGL
policy for cleanup and response costs of the EPA because claims for in-
junctions and other equitable relief are beyond the scope of the insurance
contract.59
A. CERCLA Cleanup Costs Represent Injury to Economic Interests
and Not Actual Property Damage
Congress intended that the response authority given to the federal gov-
ernment under CERCLA' be prophylactic in nature."' By granting the
EPA the power to effect a cleanup, as opposed to allowing the EPA only
the power to police those responsible, Congress sought to prevent further
migration of hazardous substances.62 Under CERCLA, Congress in-
tended to hold the responsible parties liable for the costs expended by the
government in the implementation of these prophylactic measures.6 3 Be-
cause the goal of CERCLA cleanup actions is to return the contaminated
site to a neutral condition," the EPA typically requests "restitution" of
the money expended in restoring the environment to its status quo ante. 65
Accordingly, since restitution is an equitable remedy designed to reim-
burse a party for this restoration of the status quo,6 6 it is not "merely
fortuitous" that the government chooses to pursue equitable remedies
rather than damages. 6' That equitable relief be recovered is, in fact, what
Congress intended.68
59. See Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977,
985-86 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3230 (1988); Hourihan, Insurance
Coverage for Environmental Damage Claims, 15 Forum 551, 554 (1980).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1982 & Supp. 1988).
61. This provision authorizes the EPA to take emergency actions to protect the pub-
lic health or the environment whenever an inactive site presents or may present an immi-
nent and substantial danger to public health or the environment. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 9604(a)(1) (Supp. 1988); see also Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d
1348, 1353 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988); Mraz v. Canadian Univer-
sal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1329 (4th Cir. 1986).
62. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601(23)-(25) (Supp. 1988); see New York v. Shore Realty Corp.,
759 F.2d 1032, 1041 (2d Cir. 1985).
63. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
64. See CERCLA House Report, supra note 2, at 6125; cf Continental Ins. Cos. v.
Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977, 980 (8th Cir.) (en banc) (EPA "cle-
aned up" contaminated site), cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3230 (1988); Mraz v. Canadian
Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1326 (4th Cir. 1986) (cleanup action consisted of
removing contaminated materials, disposing of contaminated soil, and treating contami-
nated water).
65. See e.g., Continental Ins Cos, 842 F.2d at 987; Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1329; Mary-
land Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1352 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 703 (1988).
66. See supra note 13.
67. See Continental Ins. Cos., 842 F.2d at 986 (rejecting reasoning in United States
Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 125 Mich. App. 579, 590, 336 N.W.2d 838, 843 (1983),
that government's choice to pursue equitable remedies was "merely fortuitous").
68. Applicable sections of CERCLA, such as 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4), which indicates
a difference between the meanings of cleanup costs and damages, make it clear that prop-
erty damage and response costs stand independent of one another. See Continental Ins.
1180 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56
CGL policies do not cover EPA "restitution," which constitutes eco-
nomic damage or equitable relief, because the CGL policies require the
insured, not a third party, to expend monies in repairing actual property
damage.69 The CGL policy definition of damages does not include reim-
bursement of response costs; 70 payments to third persons are included
only when there exists a legal claim for damages.7" Damages does not
include an obligation to pay a civil or criminal penalty, 72 the cost of com-
plying with a mandatory injunction,73 or the cost to the insured of
preventing or avoiding future loss. 74 Because in every case at issue the
government cleaned up and then sued for reimbursement, 75 the CGL
policy should not be construed to provide coverage.76
Cos., 842 F.2d at 986. For example, the government may take response action in cases
that substantially threaten a release of hazardous substances before any damage ever oc-
curs. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(a)(1) (Supp. 1988); see Continental Ins. Cos., 842 F.2d at 986;
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1353-54 (4th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988); Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1329
(4th Cir. 1986).
69. See, e.g., Continental Ins. Cos., 842 F.2d at 985-87; Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1353-54 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988);
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Hanna, 224 F.2d 499, 503 (5th Cir. 1955).
70. See Continental Ins. Cos., 842 F.2d at 987; Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co.,
804 F.2d 1325, 1329 (4th Cir. 1986); cf Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Hanna, 224 F.2d
499, 503 (5th Cir. 1955) (insurance coverage exists only for injuries expressly stated in
policy).
71. See Transport Indem. Ins. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., No. 262425, slip op. at 2 (Cal.
Super. Ct. May 25, 1988); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1352
(4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988); Hanna, 224 F.2d at 503; Desrochers
v. New York Casualty Co., 99 N.H. 129, 131-22, 106 A.2d 196, 198 (1954).
72. See Tinker, supra note 37, at 254.
73. See Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Hanna, 224 F.2d 499, 503 (5th Cir. 1955);
Desrochers v. New York Casualty Co., 99 N.H. 129, 132-33, 106 A.2d 196, 198-99
(1954); Hourihan, supra note 59, at 554; Tinker, supra note 37, at 254.
74. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1353 (4th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988); Tinker, supra note 37, at 254. For instance, if an insured
manufacturer knows of a problem with a product, a CGL policy provides no coverage for
any preventive costs such as recalling, inspecting, or replacing the products. R. Cushman
& C. Stamm, supra note 44, § 1.8, at 13. Once the products have failed, however, the
CGL covers liability for "physical damage to or loss of use of the equipment or facility in
which they were installed." Id.
75. See supra notes 49, 50 and accompanying text; cf United States v. Price, 688 F.2d
204, 212 (3d Cir. 1982) (request for funds for a diagnostic study and abatement not a
traditional form of damages); Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712, 715 (3d Cir.) ("crea-
tion of expense does not necessarily remove a form of relief from category of equitable
remedies"), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979), aff'd on reh'g, 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982).
76. See Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977,
987 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3230 (1988); Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1352 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988);
Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1329 (4th Cir. 1986); Wehner v.
Syntex Corp., 618 F. Supp. 37. 37 (E.D. Mo. 1984).
Courts confronting the EPA reimbursement issue also disagree whether a letter from
the EPA to a "Partially Responsible Person" ("PRP letter") constitutes a "suit" against
the insured, triggering coverage under a CGL policy. Compare Evart v. Home Ins. Co.,
No. 86-004019-CX, slip op. at 3 (Mich. Mar. 3, 1987) (PRP letter not a suit, but a mere
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CGL policies exclude coverage for safety precautions and reimburse-
ment 77 because insurers require certainty as to the extent of their liabil-
ity.7" This certainty enables insurers to estimate each insured's potential
liability, charge the insured a premium based on this estimate, and
thereby spread the costs of potential liability among all similar policies."'
Precautionary safety measures are subject to the discretion of the in-
sured; cleanup costs expended by an injured third party are likewise sub-
ject to the discretion of the third party.8" If these parties were assured
that insurance would cover their expenditures, they most likely would
lose their incentive to monitor costs,8' thus destroying the required ele-
ment of certainty.82 In response to the toxic waste explosion, the insur-
ance industry implemented a pollution exclusion clause which excludes
liability for gradual losses, such as seepage of chemicals that do not man-
ifest until years after the initial disposal.8 3 This exclusion, however, is
inapplicable to the cases at issue, since it was implemented after the CGL
policies concerned were issued.
Contrary to those who cling to the argument that the reasonable ex-
pectations of the insured should be honored above all else," insurers
never were intended to be risk preventers or the policemen of insureds.8 5
As one court stated, "[ifl the term 'damages' in the insurance contract
were to be given the broad, boundless connotations sought by the [in-
sured],... [it] would become mere surplusage, because any obligation to
pay would be covered."86 The CGL policy was not created to serve as an
allegation, accusation, or claim under which insurer has no duty to defend) with Fire-
man's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71, 75 (E.D. Mich. 1987) ("a
'suit' includes any effort to impose on the policyholders a liability ultimately enforceable
by a court"). The resolution of this issue is outside the scope of this Note.
77. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
78. See R. Cushman & C. Stamm, supra note 44, § 1.1, at 3; I. Taylor, The Law of
Insurance 1 (3d ed. 1983).
79. See R. Keeton, Basic Text on Insurance Law 6-7 (1971); W. Vance, Handbook on
the Law of Insurance 4 (3d ed. 1951); Tinker, supra note 37, at 224.
80. See R. Cushman & C. Stamm, supra note 44, § 1.9, at 14.
81. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1353 (4th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988); R. Cushman & C. Stamm, supra note 44, § 1.9, at 14.
82. CGL's do not cover precautionary measures for the simple reason that it is impos-
sible to predict their costs. See Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem.
Co., 842 F.2d 977, 987 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cerL denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3230 (1988);
Armco, 822 F.2d at 1353. Finding coverage for precautionary measures would force the
courts to bear the task of weeding out unnecessary measures. See Armco, 822 F.2d at
1353; R. Cushman & C. Stamm, supra note 44, § 1.9, at 14.
83. See infra note 101.
84. See infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
85. See Cheek, Risk-Spreaders or Risk-Eliminators? An Insurer's Perspective on the
Liability and Financial Responsibility Provisions of RCRA and CERCLA, 2 Va. J. Nat.
Resources L. 149 (1982); Tinker, supra note 37, at 224.
86. Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977, 986
(8th Cir.) (en bane) (quoting Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1352
(4th Cir. 1987), cerL denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988)), cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3230
(1988); see Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Hanna, 224 F.2d 499, 503 (5th Cir. 1955).
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"all-risk liability policy."87 The duty of risk elimination is contrary to
the purpose of insurance;"8 insurance principally is designed to "spread,
over time and usually over a risk group, risks that cannot otherwise eco-
nomically be managed." '89
Courts therefore must determine the availability of relief pursuant to
the CGL policy, focusing on the form of protection contracted for and
the form of relief sought under CERCLA, rather than grant relief for
purely speculative economic damage that the CGL policy does not cover.
The lack of consistent judicial interpretation of the insurance policies at
issue places an unfair, inestimable and unforeseen burden on the insur-
ance industry.90
B. Manipulation of Business Contracts to Serve Public Policy Goals is
Unjustified and Dangerous
Courts and legal scholars that find coverage for EPA response costs
under CGL policies overlook the true character of a typical insured. The
companies that purchase CGL policies are sophisticated insureds, fre-
quently having risk management divisions and often negotiating-and
even drafting-their own attached coverage provisions.9 Given the par-
ties' equal bargaining positions, the defined terms of the CGL policy,
such as the term "property damage," should be given their legal, techni-
cal meaning.92 If this is done, it becomes clear that the equitable relief
sought under the typical EPA complaint falls outside the scope of the
CGL policy.93
In contrast, courts that find coverage for EPA response costs under
CGL policies manipulate the plain language of the relevant CGL policy
provisions94 to support a broad theory of public policy. This method of
87. Tinker, supra note 37, at 220. See 11 G. Couch, supra note 35, at 44:264; Reich-
enberger, supra note 42, at 13.
88. See R. Cushman & C. Stamm, supra note 44, § 1.1, at 3; I. Taylor, supra note 78,
at 1.
89. R. Cushman & C. Stamm, supra note 44, § 1.1, at 2.
90. See Finegan, supra note 3, at 52 ("The public thinks the EPA is rounding up the
bad guys. It's not. Even the good guys realize that they have no way of fighting [liabil-
ity], and that creates a lot of ill feeling about fairness."); N.Y. Times, Jun. 11, 1985 at 1,
col. 2 (damages being paid not contemplated when insurance contracts written); 15 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 1842 (Mar. 8, 1985) (litigation costs soaring as Superfund defendants sue
insurance companies for recovery of cleanup costs in "second phase" of litigation); cf
Brandt, An Asbestos Decision That's Hazardous to Insurers' Health, Bus. Wk., June 15,
1987, at 34 (decision holding insurers liable for $2 billion in asbestos claims labeled by
insurer as "patently unfair").
91. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1350 (4th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988); see generally Arness & Eliason, supra note 44, at 950
(large companies often have extremely sophisticated risk management divisions).
92. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 70-76 and accom-
panying text.
93. See supra notes 70-82 and accompanying text.
94. See, e.g., New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 673 F. Supp.
1359, 1364 (D. Del. 1987) (mem.) (despite conclusion of county's Risk Manager that
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interpreting insurance policies as contracts of adhesion originated in or-
der to protect parties negotiating at a disadvantage." To courts that
adopt this approach, the plain language of the CGL policy is irrelevant."6
They argue that "[t]he objectively reasonable expectations of [the major-
ity of] applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of [the]
insurance contracts [should] be honored even though painstaking study
of the policy provisions would have negated those expectations." '97
Under this view, if enforcement of a policy provision, such as the exclu-
sion of coverage for EPA cleanup costs, would defeat the reasonable ex-
pectations of the great majority of policyholders to whose claims it is
pollution exclusion clause excluded claims, court found term ambiguous and construed it
in favor of insured); Broadwell Realty Servs., Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 218 NJ.
Super. 516, 527, 528 A.2d 76, 82 (App. Div. 1987) (holding that although "damages"
ordinarily does not cover "the cost of complying with an injunctive decree, ... (a] direc-
tive which threatened to assess... an amount equal to triple the costs of the prospective
cleanup operation constituted a claim for damages within the meaning of the [insurance]
policy language") (emphasis added); cf. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp.,
662 F. Supp. 71, 75 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (defining "suit" as including "any effort to impose
on the policyholders a liability ultimately enforceable by a court," court found duty to
defend insured even before policyholders became defendants in a traditional suit for
damages).
95. See W. Vance, supra note 79, at 243 (typical insurance contract is one of "adhe-
sion" whose terms "do not result from mutual negotiation and concessions of the parties
and so do not truly express an agreement at which they have arrived"); Broadwell Realty
Servs., Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 218 N.J. Super. 516, 523, 528 A.2d 76, 80 (App.
Div. 1987) (adhesion doctrine applied due to unequal bargaining power of parties); Meier
v. New Jersey Life Ins. Co., 101 N.J. 597, 612, 503 A.2d 862, 869 (1986) ("Insurance
companies possess all the expertise and unilaterally prepare the varied and complex insur-
ance policies.") See also CPS Chem. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 222 N.J. Super. 175,
189, 536 A.2d 311, 318 (App. Div. 1988) (principle that contract should be construed in
favor of insured is "no less applicable merely because the insured is itself a corporate
giant").
96. For example, because a CGL policy requires the insurer to "pay on behalf of the
insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages
because of... property damage," see infra note 102, some courts reason that damages
that flow from property damage, such as cleanup costs, are recoverable. See New Castle
County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 673 F. Supp. 1359, 1366 (D. Del. 1987)
(mem.); Riehl v. Travelers Ins. Co., 15 Env't L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,004 (W.D. Pa.
1984), rev'd on other grounds, 772 F.2d 19 (3d Cir. 1985); see also Keeton, Insurance Law
Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 961, 962 (1970) (insurance
decisions "often seem arbitrary"). This reasoning is faulty, however, because in order for
the terms of the CGL policy to have any meaning, the obligation of the insured should be
limited to pay "damages" as it is understood in an insurance context. Continental Ins.
Cos. v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977, 986 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3230 (1988). As has been established, this obligation does not in-
clude coverage for equitable relief claims. See Continental Ins. Col, 842 F.2d at 986;
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1353 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 703 (1988); supra notes 13, 74 and accompanying text.
97. Keeton, supra note 96, at 967; see, e.g., New Castle County v. Hartford Accident
& Indem. Co., 673 F. Supp. 1359, 1365 (D. Del. 1987) (mem.) (referring to Webster's
Third New International Dictionary to determine that the "definition of. . . 'damages'
makes no distinction between actions at law and actions in equity"); Broadwell Realty
Servs., Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 218 N.J. Super. 516, 526, 528 A.2d 76, 81 (App.
Div. 1987) (abatement measures designed to prevent continued property damage covered
by CGL policy based on theory of honoring the reasonable expectations of the insured).
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relevant, it should not be enforced even against those who knew of its
restrictive terms at the time of contracting.9"
Advocates of this type of approach erroneously assert that these re-
sults are justified by goals of promoting efficiency, equity and risk distri-
bution.99 Such an approach, however, does a grave injustice to the
sanctity of contract, "finding ambiguities in the policies even where none
exist, ' ' "° because it is clear from the insurance industry's many attempts
to clarify its CGL policy for the courts and insureds'01 that insurers
98. See Keeton, supra note 96, at 974; see also New Castle County, 673 F. Supp. at
1362; Meier v. New Jersey Life Ins. Co., 101 N.J. 597, 612, 503 A.2d 862, 869 (1986).
99. See New Castle County, 673 F. Supp. at 1365; Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Ex-
Cell-O Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71, 75 (E.D. Mich. 1987); United States v. Conservation
Chem. Co., 653 F. Supp. 152, 194 (W.D. Mo. 1986); see also Abraham, Judge-Made Law
and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 Va.
L. Rev. 1151, 1168-89 (1981).
100. F. Kessler, G. Gilmore & A. Kronman, Contracts 632 (3d ed. 1986), (quoting
Keeton, supra note 96, at 962). See, e.g., Moulton, Allen & Williams, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d 95, 99 (Ala. 1977) (identifying clear intent of pollution
exclusion clause, but holding language ambiguous); Searle v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 38
Cal. 3d 425, 445, 696 P.2d 1308, 1320-21, 212 Cal. Rptr. 466, 478-79 (Sup. Ct. 1985)
(Bird, C.J., dissenting in part, concurring in part) (arguing term "sanity" is ambiguous in
insurance policy).
101. The purpose of the CGL policy has always been to provide coverage on behalf of
the insured to an injured third party. R. Cushman & C. Stamm, supra note 44, § 1.5, at
8. Since they were first released in 1940, standard general liability insurance policies have
been revised in 1943, 1955, 1966, 1973, and 1986 in an attempt by the insurance industry
to, among other things, clarify how far this duty to provide coverage extends. See Gen-
eral Liability Insurance 1973 Revisions, supra note 37, at 3 (discussing policy revisions,
1940-1973); Tinker, supra note 37, at 221. The 1973 revisions to the CGL policy in part
were made in response to a "changing society, reflecting, for example, recent efforts to
reduce industrial pollution." General Liability Insurance 1973 Revisions, supra note 37,
at 3; see also supra notes 42, 44 and accompanying text. The 1986 revisions completely
remove any liability for environmental pollution. See 50 Fed. Reg. 33,903 (1985); see also
Chesler, Rodburg & Smith, supra note 50, at 13 n.27 (insurance industry's revisions of
CGL policy in reaction to possible pollution liability). The courts have not yet tackled
this policy version; its interpretation and impact on the insurance industry are therefore
outside the scope of this Note.
Since 1973, the CGL's have contained "Exclusion (f)" (hereinafter the "pollution ex-
clusion clause"), which states:
(f) [It is agreed that the insurance does not apply] to bodily injury or property
damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, va-
pors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materi-
als or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the
atmosphere or any water course or body of water; but this exclusion does not
apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental
(emphasis in original).
Sample CGL policy (available in the files of the Fordham Law Review); Reichenberger,
supra note 42, at 14.
The pollution exclusion clause was intended to limit insurance coverage in order to
give certainty to insurance liability. See infra notes 82, 85-88 and accompanying text.
Insurers did not want to be liable for gradual pollution which could reach catastrophic
proportions. See Note, supra note 49, at 1242. In addition, insurers did not want to
condone or encourage chemical companies to dump wastes; they hoped that by denying
coverage for this gradual pollution they would provide an incentive for businesses to take
precautions to protect the environment. Id. at 1253 n.82.
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never intended to cover the reimbursement claims being brought by the
EPA. 102
It is wrong for courts to impose this interpretation of the CGL policy
on insurers. 10 3 When dealing with a sophisticated insured, the public
policy rationale for construing the document against the insurer disap-
pears.'4 Moreover, interpreting the CGL to cover cleanup costs carries
the policy into unknown and unforeseeable realms,'05 for the possible
liability of an insured under CERCLA is "so huge as to defy the mea-
surement essential to insurability."' 6
Nevertheless, some opinions state that when a "new" situation devel-
ops, such as EPA claims for cleanup costs, technical definitions of insur-
ance policies should give way to considerations of public policy. ' Their
authors thus look beyond the insurance policy and find coverage, regard-
less of the carefully drafted CGL policy language, 0 8 so that injured par-
ties are not left uncompensated. "o Advocates of this position attempt to
102. See General Liability Insurance 1973 Revisions, supra note 37, at 3.
The CGL policy generally obligates the insurer only
to pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally
obligated to pay as damages because of
A. bodily injury or
B. property damage to which this insurance applies, caused by an occur-
rence, and the company shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against
the insured seeking damages on account of such bodily injury or propertydamage ....
Sample CGL policy (available in the files of the Fordham Law Review); see also Riehl v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 772 F.2d 19, 20 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting language of CGL policy).
103. See Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977,
986 (8th Cir.) (en banc) (contract language clearly limits the term "damages"), cert. de-
nied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3230 (1988); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348,
1354 (4th Cir. 1987) (insurance contract uses term "damages" in legal sense), cert. de-
nied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988).
104. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. Cf MGIC Indemnity Corp. v. Central
Bank of Monroe, 838 F.2d 1382, 1387 (5th Cir. 1988) (equitable rationale behind notice
provision "does not apply nearly so forcefully where both the insured and the insurer are
sophisticated businesses, which are expected to be conversant with the terms of their
contracts.").
105. Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977, 986
(8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3230 (1988); Cheek, supra note 85, at 169;
cf Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1845) (courts should award only
such damages in breach of contract as fairly and reasonably may have been contemplated
by the parties at the time of contract).
106. Cheek, supra note 85, at 169.
107. See cases cited supra note 94; see also Spurgeon, supra note 50, at 399.
108. Insurers specifically tailored the term "damages" to exclude equitable relief in
order to provide certainty as to their liability. Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern
Pharm. & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977, 986 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cerL denied, 57 U.S.L.W.
3230 (1988); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1352-53 (4th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988); General Liability Insurance 1973 Revisions,
supra note 37, at 3.
109. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71, 76 (E.D.
Mich. 1987) (broadly interpreting policy to cover each "exposure of the environment to a
pollutant"); Lansco, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 138 NJ. Super. 275, 283,
350 A.2d 520, 524 (App. Div. 1975) (insured should receive coverage for any injury "not
1988] 1185
1186 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56
justify this view in the name of promoting public welfare," 10 concluding
that there should be "a virtual per se rule favoring satisfaction of funda-
mental interests [such as preserving the environment] over protection of
the ability [of insurers] to engage in market activities."'1 1
These courts and legal theorists rely on faulty reasoning. Public pol-
icy, however persuasive, should not determine the interpretation of a
legal contract, Iz for "it is a great step, and a dangerous one, for courts to
begin to construe insurance policies to encompass costs of compliance
with injunctive and reimbursement relief.""' 3 In order to preserve the
element of certainty in meeting demands for coverage, insurers intention-
ally omit coverage for these types of equitable relief.' By overlooking
these intentional omissions, courts deny insurers the freedom to deter-
mine the terms of a legally binding contract." 5
C. Judicial Misinterpretation of CGL Policies Has Contributed to an
Insurance Crisis
Whatever justification underlies these holdings, it seems clear that ju-
dicial findings of CGL coverage stem from a need to find liable for the
cleanup of toxic wastes those with the deepest pockets.' 16 Because many
specifically excluded"), aff'd 145 N.J. Super. 433, 368 A.2d 363 (1976); see also
Spurgeon, supra note 50, at 389.
110. Note, Adjudicating Asbestos Insurance Liability: Alternatives to Contract Analysis,
97 Harv. L. Rev. 739, 756 (1984); cf New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co., 673 F. Supp. 1359, 1365 (D. Del. 1987) (mem.) (under Delaware law, insurance
policy language should be given its ordinary and usual meaning to maximize benefit to
insured).
111. Note, supra note 110, at 756 (footnotes omitted). It is also believed that because
contract doctrine has not reached solid conclusions as to insurers' liability for asbestos-
related diseases and other "new" issues, a court must "consider the effect of its decision
not only on the parties to the insurance contract, but also on other parties who are sub-
stantially affected by any liability rule that is adopted." Id. at 757-58. Such a manipula-
tive approach, however, is dangerous, because it renders the terms of the CGL policy
practically meaningless, at the expense of the insurance industry.
112. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1353 (4th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988); see also Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Hanna, 224 F.2d
499, 503 (5th Cir. 1955); Ladd Constr. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 73 I11. App. 3d
43, 50, 391 N.E.2d 568, 574 (1979).
113. Armco, 822 F.2d at 1353; see Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharm. &
Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977, 986 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3230 (1988).
114. See supra note 48.
115. Freedom of contract should be restrained only in exceptional circumstances. Ol-
sen v. Nebraska ex rel. Western Reference & Bond Ass'n, Inc., 313 U.S. 236, 237 (1941);
see Scarborough v. Travelers Ins. Co., 718 F.2d 702, 709 (5th Cir. 1983).
Moreover, the business of insurance is specifically excluded from the Sherman Anti-
trust Laws under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1013 (1982). This exemption
was intended to enable insurers to underwrite risks accurately, unhampered by artificial
ratemaking regulations. Freedom of contract has therefore been legislatively preserved in
the insurance industry. Note, The Business of Insurance: Exemption, Exemption, Who
Has the Antitrust Exemption, 17 Pac. L.J. 261, 266-67 (1985). See 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b)
(1982 & Supp. 1988).
116. See 50 Fed. Reg. 33,905 (1985); M. Katzman, supra note 3, at 4-5; cf. 17 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 609 (1986) (EPA in search of deep pocket).
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of the polluting insureds have gone bankrupt and are unable to pay
cleanup expenses, 117 many courts and legal theorists presently view the
insurance companies as the most viable source for toxic waste cleanup
expenses."' 8 As is evidenced by the recent insurance crisis," 9 however,
insurance companies, at best, offer only a temporary solution to the
courts' search for cleanup funds, as insurance coverage for companies
with potential for toxic waste liability has virtually vanished from the
market. 120
Judicial misinterpretation of insurance policies and the finding of cov-
erage for EPA response costs has helped to stimulate an insurance cri-
sis' 21 unanticipated by CERCLA's proponents.' 22 Congress corrected
this in its implementation of SARA indicating that, contrary to many
judicial opinions and legal theorists, Congress never intended insurers to
bear the brunt of CERCLA liability.' 23
One of SARA's provisions directs the President to appoint a study
117. See Combustion Equip. Assoc., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency,
838 F.2d 35, 36 (2d Cir. 1988); Wall Tube & Metal Prods. Co. v. Tennessee, 831 F.2d 118
(6th Cir. 1987); cf Schroeder, The Toxic Waste Battle is Boiling Over, Bus. Wk., Aug. 3,
1987, 73, 74 ("specter of many manufacturers and insurance companies going belly-up
could even bring pressure on the federal government to divert taxpayer money to pay for
cleaning up hazardous waste sites nationwide").
118. See supra note 116.
119. In early 1986, in response to estimates of the magnitude of future liability claims,
insurers announced drastically sharp increases in premiums in several commercial liabil-
ity lines and completely withdrew coverage in others. See Priest, Modern Tort Law and
its Reform, 22 Val. U.L. Rev. 1, 2-3 (1987); Farrell, The Insurance Crisis" Now Everyone
Is In A Risky Business, Bus. Wk., March 10, 1986, at 88; see also 17 Env't Rep. (BNA)
791 (Sep. 26, 1986) (statement of Dennis R. Connolly, a vice president of Johnson &
Higgins, insurance brokerage firm) (imposition of strict liability applied on retroactive
basis "has been a major reason for the elimination of environmental liability insurance");
cf N.Y. Times, March 5, 1988, 52, col. 1 (five-year trend in increasing automobile insur-
ance rates believed to continue as long as the tort liability system continues to produce
large awards for claimants); see also infra notes 122-27 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 101.
121. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
122. See Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, H.R. Rep. No.
253(I), 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1, 109, reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
2835, 2891 (hereinafter "SARA House Report").
123. In its creation of CERCLA, Congress intended that polluters pay for the cleanup
of toxic wastes according to the amount of their hazardous waste contribution. See Envi-
ronmental Emergency Response Act, S. Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1, 92, re-
printed in 1 A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (Superfund) Public Law 96-510, at 308, 320;
CERCLA House Report, supra note 2, at 6137.
In its early enforcement of CERCLA, however, the EPA often could not locate respon-
sible polluters, or discovered that the polluters had become insolvent. See SARA House
Report, supra note 122, at 2857; Wall Tube & Metal Prods. Co. v. Tennessee, 831 F.2d
118, 120 (6th Cir. 1987). The courts then began applying joint and several liability
against any found polluter. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032,
1043-44 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573,
580 (D. Md. 1986). Those found liable for cleanup costs then turned to their insurers for
coverage, and some courts held the insurers liable for coverage. See cases cited supra
note 50; infra note 124 and accompanying text.
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group to examine the availability of insurance for environmentally re-
lated liabilities. 24 The House report shows that legislators were aware
of the growing unavailability of insurance for businesses that "use, gener-
ate, treat, or dispose of hazardous substances." 125 It cites as partly re-
sponsible for the lack of insurance "judicial trends regarding policy
interpretations that have called upon old policies to pay for claims that
were not envisioned at the time policies were written, and unpredictable
and changing statutory liabilities." 1 26
Thus, the manipulation of CGL policies to cover EPA cleanup costs
has created a no-win situation for insurance companies that have been
forced to provide coverage to polluting insureds. This burden has ex-
panded beyond potential polluters, resulting in increased premiums to
other insureds, such as automobile owners, and has resulted in a scarcity
of liability insurance for environmentally related activities. 127 In the end,
the cleanup costs do get paid, but the consequence of this judicially man-
dated payment, as explained in the following section, is the unplanned
and unfair treatment of insurance companies and of all insureds.
D. The Problem of CGL Coverage for Toxic Waste Cleanups Requires
a Legislative Solution
Neither Congress, in its creation of CERCLA, nor the courts, have
analyzed sufficiently the consequences on society of judicial misinterpre-
tation of CGL policies. Courts that find coverage under CGL policies
for EPA response costs in effect determine that every insured American
ultimately will bear the cost of toxic waste cleanup. 28 Forcing insurers
to cover the highly unpredictable risks associated with CERCLA liabil-
ity129 puts insurers in the role of risk-preventers130 and denies them the
ability to spread risks reasonably among similar policies.13 ' Therefore,
they are forced to spread the costs of risks among all insureds through
premiums for other types of insurance.' 32
Because not every American obtains insurance, 33 this spreading of
124. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9651(g) (Supp. 1988); Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613, 1707 (1986).
125. SARA House Report, supra note 122, at 2891.
126. Id.
127. See supra notes 101, 119 and accompanying text; see also supra note 37.
128. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
129. See CERCLA House Report, supra note 2, at 6123; Schroeder, supra note 117, at
73; N.Y. Times, Jun. 11, 1985, at 1, col. 2.
130. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1353 (4th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988); supra note 88 and accompanying text.
131. Abraham, supra note 99, at 1187; Taylor, supra note 78, at 1.
132. See N.Y. Times, Jun. 11, 1985, at 1, col. 2 (sweeping changes in insurance cover-
age predicted to spread to individual automobile insurance due to rise in court-ordered
damage awards for pollution, product liability, and personal injury); Farrell, supra note
119, at 88 (professions, businesses and government suffering from inflating insurance
costs and decreasing benefits); supra note 37.
133. For example, an estimated 37 million Americans were without health insurance
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costs through premiums for all insurance ultimately penalizes only those
citizens who purchase insurance. Society at large also suffers when busi-
nesses, municipalities, and professionals, unable to afford the high cost of
insurance, cut services rather than operate with inadequate insurance
coverage.134 In contrast, courts that refuse to find coverage under CGL
policies for EPA response costs ultimately determine that it is unfair to
spread the costs of pollution to all insureds. 35 These courts, in effect, are
requesting a congressional solution to this national problem of fairly dis-
tributing toxic waste cleanup costs.
Arguably, the United States government is the best risk-bearer and
risk-spreader. Although it is an unpopular notion, the government's
power to spread costs equally through its taxation power probably offers
the fairest approach to the problem of catastrophic toxic waste cleanup
costs. Through direct federal taxation, historically a major instrument of
social and economic policy, 136 Americans would share the burden of
toxic waste cleanup according to their ability to pay. 137 This ultimately
would result in a fairer solution than does placing the entire burden of
cleaning up toxic wastes on the insurance industry and, indirectly, only
on insurance consumers.
Toxic waste cleanup represents a national problem and should be paid
for by the nation as a whole, rather than by a portion of the population.
In addition, Congress, with its expertise and resources, is a much better
fact-finding body than the courts.' 38 Therefore, the complicated analysis
of how best to assess and deal with toxic waste problems should be left in
in the mid-1980's. See Cahan, The Real Health Care Catastrophe: More than 30 Million
Uninsured, Bus. Wk., Feb. 9, 1987, at 29.
134. For instance, fewer doctors now deliver babies, and cities have had to shut down
social services in order to lessen their exposure to liability. See Farrell, supra note 119, at
88.
135. See supra note 49.
136. According to one author, the goals of taxation are "to transfer resources from the
private to the public sector;, to distribute the cost of government fairly by income classes
... and among people in approximately the same economic circumstances... ; and to
promote economic growth, stability and efficiency." J. Pechman, Federal Tax Policy 5
(5th ed. 1987). See also R. Musgrave & P. Musgrave, Public Finance In Theory and
Practice 210-11 (1973) (listing similar goals of taxation).
137. See R. Musgrave & P. Musgrave, supra note 136, at 210-11; J. Pechman, supra
note 136, at 5; cf New York ex reL Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 313 (1937) ("A tax
measured by the net income of residents is an equitable method of distributing the bur-
dens of government among those who are privileged to enjoy its benefits.").
138. Courts generally acknowledge Congress' superior fact-finding ability. See, e.g.,
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981) (great weight is accorded to the decisions
of Congress, with its competence in the area of raising and regulating armies and navies);
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980) ("The choice we are urged to make
[concerning the grant or denial of patents on micro-organisms] is a matter of high policy
for resolution within the legislative process after the kind of investigation, examination,
and study that legislative bodies can provide and courts cannot."); Katzenbach v. Mc-
Clung, 379 U.S. 294, 301 (1964) (Congress conducted lengthy hearings on Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, and thus was best situated to determine that a connection ex-
isted between discrimination and the movement of interstate commerce).
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the hands of Congress alone. Although CERCLA and SARA represent
an attempt by Congress to deal with the toxic waste issue, the confusion
over the statutes' application indicates that Congress must do more than
it has to clean up the environment. It must clarify the statutes and over-
see their effective implementation. Provision of a superfund alone will
not result in a clean environment, and, as has been demonstrated in this
Note, this important issue requires too much fact-finding and oversight
to be left in the hands of the courts.
CONCLUSION
Analysis of the applicable provisions of CERCLA and the language
and purpose of the CGL policies leads to the logical conclusion that
CGL policies do not cover EPA claims for recovery of cleanup costs
under CERCLA. It is very easy to become outraged at the state of the
environment and to hold those perceived to have the deepest pockets lia-
ble for cleaning it up; it becomes particularly easy to allow public policy
concerns to overshadow apparently purely contractual issues. The
courts, however, have a duty to maintain objectivity in their approach to
the problem of suits concerning toxic waste.
As has been done consistently in the Fourth Circuit, courts must look
to the form of relief sought in the EPA complaints and find that these
claims for equitable relief are not covered by CGL policies. By forcing
insurance companies to reimburse insureds for equitable relief, the courts
do violence to the intent of the CGL policies. By ignoring the language
of CGL policies, individual courts determine, without a congressional
directive, who they think should bear the costs of cleaning up toxic
wastes.
It is clear that the courts have not contributed to the certainty of CER-
CLA litigation. What is needed is a congressional effort to determine the
fairest means of spreading the cost of toxic waste cleanup throughout
society in order to spare the insurance industry and all insureds from the
devastating burden of shouldering the costs alone.
Sharon L. McCarthy
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